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 A rapid serial visual presentation task (RSVP) was combined with the 
‘inattention’ paradigm (Mack & Rock, 1998) to investigate the effect of cognitive 
load on the detection of an unexpected stimulus. In addition, the detection of an 
unexpected stimulus presented in conjunction with a distractor item, rather than 
target, was also investigated. Seventy four students of the University of Canterbury 
participated in one of five experiments. Participants either performed a high 
cognitive load version of the RSVP task, selecting items on the basis of colour and 
semantic category, or a low cognitive load version selecting items on the basis of 
colour only. On the final frame of the fourth and critical trial, an unexpected 
stimulus appeared in conjunction with either a target or distractor item. The level of 
inattentional blindness to the unexpected stimulus was the result of interest. No 
effect of cognitive load or presentation partner was found. The implications of the 
results for the load theory of attention and cognitive control are discussed, along 












The effect of load on the detection of an unexpected stimulus in a rapid serial visual 
presentation task 
 
 Do you think you would notice if a gorilla walked by? Would you notice if 
the person you were in conversation with was replaced by someone else? Most of us 
would answer these questions with certainty: yes, of course we would notice. 
However, research investigating the relationship between perception and attention 
suggests otherwise. Simons and Chabris (1999) found 44% of people failed to 
detect a gorilla walking through a basketball game they were watching because they 
were concentrating their attention on counting the number of passes made with the 
ball. This is just one of many demonstrations of inattentional blindness (IB), a term 
coined by Mack and Rock (1998) to refer to the failure to detect an unexpected 
suprathreshold stimulus while attention is otherwise engaged. Such failures of 
perception in the absence of attention led Mack and Rock to propose there is no 
conscious perception without attention.  
 
Perception, attention, and awareness 
 For decades the relationship between perception, attention, and awareness 
has been extensively investigated and debated, with particular emphasis on the 
processes involved in attention. For the purposes of this thesis, the term perception 
is used to refer to both the voluntary and involuntary processing of information 
provided to us by our senses, and awareness to refer to the state of conscious 
knowledge that results once the perceptual information has been attended and 
processed to a level of conscious report (Lamme, 2003). Attention is the complex 
mechanism involved in selecting what information (from the multitudes available 
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from the senses) is processed sufficiently to support conscious awareness 
(Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Furthermore, several researchers of attention and 
consciousness describe how top-down attention is necessary for the conscious 
detection of unexpected stimuli (e.g. Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & 
Sergent, 2006; Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007; and Lamme, 2003). Therefore, attention 
can be considered as the necessary link between perception and consciousness. 
Furthermore, researchers agree that attention is a selection mechanism and that at 
some point in the processing of information, selection must occur (Lavie, 1995; 
Styles, 2006). However, there is no consensus regarding the particular point in 
information processing where this selection occurs. 
 
Early versus late selection 
 There are two major camps in the debate over the locus of selection: those 
who argue for early selection, and those who argue for late selection. Broadbent 
(1958) proposed a filter theory of attention which argues for early selection of 
relevant information based on simple physical attributes. Broadbent’s early 
selection filter theory proposes a bottleneck that occurs after the processing of 
physical features, which stops irrelevant information from being processed beyond 
its physical attributes. In contrast, J. Deutsch and D. Deutsch (1963) proposed a late 
selection theory that argues selection does not occur until after the semantic 
meaning of the information has been processed. Unlike early selection theories, late 
selection theories assume that perception is unlimited in processing capacity, and 
that the selection bottleneck occurs after full perception and immediately before 
response selection. Treisman (1960) proposed an intermediate position in which 
information about unattended stimuli is not completely filtered out but is 
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‘attenuated’ and provides weaker signals than the attended stimuli. Over the past 
four decades, a multitude of research has explored these theories (see Driver, 2001 
for a review) without a resolution to the selection debate. However, recently Lavie 
and her colleagues (see Lavie, 2000; Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert & Viding, 2004) have 
proposed a load theory of attention and cognitive control that offers a possible 
resolution. 
 
The load theory of attention and cognitive control 
 Lavie et al.’s (2004) load theory of attention proposes two mechanisms of 
selective attention that enable people to engage in goal directed selective attention. 
The first mechanism is involved in the perceptual selection of information. 
According to the theory, perception is limited in capacity, and perceptual 
“processing proceeds from relevant to irrelevant items until capacity runs out” 
(Lavie & Cox, 1997, p. 395). The perceptual selection mechanism operates so that 
when the attentional resources demanded by the primary task are high and exhaust 
all available perceptual capacity, irrelevant distractors are excluded from perception 
because no available perceptual resources remain to process them. However, when 
the primary task is low in perceptual load, not all of the perceptual capacity is 
engaged, and any unused capacity is obligatorily assigned to processing task 
irrelevant information. Therefore, the locus of the attentional bottleneck depends on 
the perceptual load of the task. Lavie et al. (2004) argue for early selection under 
conditions of high load, and late selection under conditions of low load because the 
unused resources available will have been applied to process even irrelevant 
information to a deeper level. Lavie and Tsal (1994) provide a review of the 
previous selective attention literature, and describe how the studies supportive of 
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late selection typically involve tasks of low perceptual load, whereas studies 
supportive of early selection typically involve high perceptual load tasks. Further 
support for the role of perceptual load in selective attention has been found from 
studies that directly manipulate perceptual load, using a variety of tasks and 
paradigms. 
 Using a modified flanker task (B. A. Eriksen & C. W. Eriksen, 1974) that 
required participants to search for a target letter among distractors made of either 
the same letters (low load) or different letters (high load), Lavie and Cox (1997) 
demonstrated an effect of perceptual load on the magnitude of distractor 
interference in a visual search task. They found greater distractor interference in the 
low load condition than in the high load condition. Lavie (1995) reported that 
increasing the task relevant set size decreased distractor interference. She also 
showed an effect of perceptual load on distractor interference in a go/no-go task 
using a feature versus conjunction manipulation of perceptual load. She found 
greater distractor interference under low load, in which responses were made on the 
basis of a colour feature distinction, than high load conditions, in which responses 
were made to a conjunction of colour and shape features.  
 Perceptual load has also been found to affect levels of negative priming 
(Lavie & Fox, 2000). The term negative priming refers to the phenomenon in which 
reaction times to previously ignored stimuli are slowed. Lavie and Fox presented 
participants with pairs of prime-probe displays in which participants were required 
to ignore the prime display and decide if a target letter was present in the probe 
display. The perceptual load of the prime display was manipulated by increasing the 
number of letters presented in the prime display to create a high perceptual load 
display. On one third of the prime-probe pairs presented, the target letter was 
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presented in both the prime and probe displays creating a negative priming situation 
in which the target is ignored prior to becoming the target. Lavie and Fox found that 
increased perceptual load in the prime display led to decreased negative priming 
effects.  
 However, it is important to note that studies investigating the effects of 
perceptual load that involve manipulations of set size may be confounded. Increases 
in set sizes have typically increase the perceptual saliency of the distractor at the 
expense of the target in the large set size (high load) conditions. This relationship 
between load and saliency makes interpretation of results difficult as salient objects, 
such as the sudden onset of a stimulus, can capture attention. Eltiti, Wallace and Fox 
(2005) investigated both the perceptual load and the saliency hypotheses of 
distractor interference in a series of distractor onset-offset experiments. The saliency 
hypothesis predicts greater distractor interference when the distractor is an onset 
rather than an offset. Eltiti et al. used a letter identification task in which a central 
circle of letters was accompanied by a distractor box. In the onset condition an 
empty distractor box was presented with a central fixation circle followed by the 
letter identification display which would then have a distractor letter presented in 
the distractor box. In the offset condition the distractor box accompanying the 
fixation circle contained a figure eight placeholder, which then became a distractor 
letter in the letter identification display. The results of the distractor onset conditions 
supported the perceptual load hypothesis, but those of the offset conditions did not, 
suggesting it is distractor saliency rather than perceptual load that determines 
distractor interference. 
 Furthermore, Chen (2003) suggests the extent of attentional focus may be a 
further confounding factor in many experiments on the perceptual load effect. The 
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zoom lens model of attention (Eriksen & St. James, 1986) likens the focus of 
attention to a zoom lens that can vary in size. The tasks employed by Lavie and her 
colleagues (e.g. Lavie, 1995, Lavie & Cox, 1997) have, in majority, been restricted 
to those that use separate targets and distractors and thus the increase in load is often 
confounded with a widening of attentional focus. Chen found that when the focus of 
attention is narrowed around a single object in both high and low load conditions 
using a Stroop task, high perceptual load leads to greater Stroop interference, the 
reverse of the expected perceptual load effect. Therefore, although there is 
substantial evidence for a role of perceptual load in selective attention, Lavie’s 
theory may be limited to situations in which the spatial extent of the focus of 
attention increases with the load level, and when the relevant and irrelevant task 
information belong to separate objects that are situated in separate locations. 
 Lavie has recently proposed a second mechanism of attention that is 
susceptible to memory load effects: she postulates an active mechanism of 
attentional control that is dependent on higher cognitive functions (Lavie et al., 
2004). As the majority of attention research tasks require participants to respond 
only to relevant information and ignore irrelevant information, there needs to be a 
mechanism involved in ensuring accuracy of task performance. Lavie et al. describe 
how the cognitive functions of the frontal cortices are “crucial for maintaining task 
processing priorities between relevant and irrelevant stimuli in order to guide 
behaviour in accordance with current goals” (p341). As the load on cognitive 
control resources increases, the ability to control behavioural responses and 
performance accuracy decreases, leading to greater interference from irrelevant 
stimuli. Note, increases in cognitive control load act only when perceptual load is 
low. Furthermore, unlike increases in perceptual load which decrease distractor 
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interference effects, increases in cognitive control load increase distractor 
interference effects.  
 Lavie et al. (2004) present a series of experiments in which they manipulate 
cognitive control load by manipulating working memory load. Participants were 
required to memorise either a single digit (low load) or a six digit memory set (high 
load) before performing a selective attention task in which a target letter and 
distractor letter were presented, followed by a recognition test. The results were 
supportive of the cognitive control load hypothesis, with greater distractor 
interference on the selective attention task occurring under high memory load 
conditions. A subsequent experiment investigated both working memory and 
perceptual load. The working memory load manipulation remained the same as in 
the previous experiment, and perceptual load was manipulated by increasing the 
relevant set size of the selective attention task display. The results supported both 
the perceptual and memory load hypotheses with greatest distractor interference in 
the low perceptual /high working memory load condition, and the least in the high 
perceptual/low working memory load condition. Furthermore, the results of the low 
perceptual/low working memory load condition in contrast with the high 
perceptual/high working memory load condition indicate perceptual load has 
primacy over cognitive load with the low load conditions resulting in greater 
distractor interference than the high load conditions. 
 However, Park, Kim and Chun (2007) propose a specialised load account, in 
which the level of distractor interference is dependent upon the interaction “between 
different types of dissociable processing mechanisms, each with independent, 
limited capacity (multiple resources)” (p. 1071). Using a same/different face-
matching task, Park et al. manipulated the relationship between the working 
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memory load and the target/distractor. Park et al. suggest the results indicate support 
for a specialised load account because working memory load led to impaired 
selection under target load conditions, but resulted in facilitated selection under 
distractor load conditions. Park et al. suggest that working memory load has an 
effect only when the same processing mechanisms are involved in processing both 
the working memory load information and the targets.  
  As mentioned earlier, Chen (2003) suggested the perceptual load 
mechanism may be limited to situations in which a wide focus of attention is 
required. A recent study by Gao, Chen, and Russell (2007) found evidence for the 
same limitation of the cognitive control mechanism. In a Stroop task, similar to that 
used by Chen (2003), Gao et al. manipulated the spatial extent of attention and 
working memory (by increasing the size of the memory set). The results showed 
that when the spatial extent of attentional focus is controlled, working memory load 
has little effect on distractor interference. Furthermore, Chen and Chan (2007) also 
investigated the correlation between working memory load effects and the extent of 
attentional focus. Their results were consistent with those of Gao et al., with 
working memory load having little effect on distractor processing when the extent 
of attentional focus is held constant. 
 However, it is important to note that the investigations described above all 
manipulated working memory load in their investigation of the cognitive control 
mechanism and load theory. Furthermore, the working memory load is not 
incorporated into the selection task, but is instead separate, creating a dual task 
situation. Two inattentional blindness (IB) studies (to be discussed in detail later) 
that incorporated working memory load into the selection task (Fougnie & Marois, 
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2007; Simons & Chabris, 1999) found working memory load facilitated selection 
rather than impaired it as predicted by Lavie et al. (2004). 
 
Inattentional blindness  
 IB is a useful tool that can be used to investigate numerous aspects of 
attention and awareness such as the nature of attention: when it is object or space 
based, whether selection occurs early or late, and if selection is affected by load. It 
can also be used to explore the nature of attention capture, particularly the roles of 
stimulus meaning and attentional set. IB research has primarily relied on two 
paradigms, namely the ‘selective looking’ paradigm developed by Neisser and 
Becklen (1975) and the ‘inattention’ paradigm developed by Mack and Rock 
(1998).  
 Developed as a visual version of the dichotic listening task used to 
investigate auditory selective attention (e.g. Cherry 1953), Neisser and Becklen 
(1975) used the ‘selective looking’ paradigm to investigate sustained attention, and 
provided a demonstration of IB. Participants were required to attend to one of two 
superimposed video tapes, one of which depicted three people playing a basketball 
game, the other a hand-slapping game. Neisser and Becklen found that while 
participants were attending to one game, they often failed to notice an odd event 
that occurred in the ignored game. This method of investigating the detection of 
unexpected events is known as the ‘selective looking’ paradigm and was 
extensively used by Neisser and his colleagues. 
 More recently, Most and colleagues (see Most, Scholl, Clifford & Simons, 
2005; Most, Simons, Scholl, Jimenez, Clifford & Chabris, 2001) have used 
variations of the ‘selective looking’ paradigm to investigate the roles of similarity 
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and attentional set in IB. Most et al. (2001) found that 94% of participants detected 
the unexpected stimulus when it was the same colour as the selected task set. 
However, when the stimulus was the same colour as the ignored distractor set only 
6% of participants reported seeing the unexpected cross stimulus. They concluded 
that featural similarity to the attended set enhanced detection. Most et al (2005) 
later expanded upon these findings, and suggested attentional set plays an important 
role in the detection of unexpected stimuli. The greater the similarity between the 
attended set and the unexpected stimulus and the greater the distinction between the 
distractor set and the unexpected stimulus, the more likely the unexpected stimulus 
will be noticed. 
 In addition to the research conducted with the ‘selective looking’ paradigm, 
IB has also been extensively studied using Mack and Rock’s (1998) ‘inattention’ 
paradigm. Typically the ‘inattention’ paradigm requires participants to engage in a 
highly demanding primary task that requires them to judge which arm of a briefly 
displayed cross is longer. They complete this task for three trials until, on the 
critical trial (the fourth trial), an unexpected critical stimulus is presented together 
with the cross in one of its quadrants. The critical trial is then followed by a divided 
attention trial and a full attention trial to ensure that the critical stimulus is 
detectable when it is no longer unexpected. Surprisingly, clearly suprathreshold 
critical stimuli fail to be consciously perceived by as many as 25% of participants 
in the critical trial when their attention was engaged on the primary cross task. 
Furthermore, Mack and Rock found IB (20%) to a black square critical stimulus 
that appeared on one of the arms of the primary cross task. Therefore, the critical 
stimulus occupied the same spatial location as that of the attended object, but was 
not detected by 20% of people.  
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 However, several IB studies investigating attention capture have found that 
some shape and word stimuli breakthrough and capture attention. In particular, 
meaningful shape stimuli such as body silhouettes (Downing, Bray, Rogers, & 
Childs, 2004), and happy smiling faces (Mack & Rock, 1998) capture attention, 
resulting in reduced levels of IB. Furthermore, one’s own name also captures 
attention (Mack & Rock).  
 Inattentional blindness and perceptual load 
 More recently, the ‘inattention’ paradigm has been used to investigate 
Lavie’s load theory. Using a variation of the classic Mack and Rock (1998) 
‘inattention’ cross task, Cartwright-Finch and Lavie (2007) investigated the role of 
perceptual load on IB. The cross task was modified so that the two arms of the 
cross were different colours (green and blue, as opposed to both black in Mack & 
Rock), and were slightly different in length. The low perceptual load condition 
involved a simple colour discrimination task, whereas the high load condition was a 
line-length discrimination task. The line-length discriminations were subtle and 
demanded “considerably more attentional resources” (Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 
2007, p.326) than the clearly distinctive colour discriminations. On the critical trial, 
a black outline square was presented concurrently with the cross. Cartwright-Finch 
and Lavie found 45% of participants in the low load condition were blind to the 
critical stimulus, while in comparison, 90% of participants in the high load 
condition failed to detect it. Thus, the results support the predicted effect of 
perceptual load, with greater interference and detection of distractors under low 




 Inattentional blindness and cognitive load 
  However, the cognitive load component of Lavie’s theory has not found 
consistent support from IB studies. For example, a sustained IB study conducted by 
Simons and Chabris (1999) used a variation of the ‘selective looking’ paradigm to 
investigate IB in dynamic events. Participants were presented with a video of two 
3-person teams playing games with a basketball (either in black or white clothing). 
During the 75 second film of the ball games, either a man wearing a gorilla suit, or 
a woman carrying an umbrella would walk through the scene (lasting for 5 
seconds). The task also included a load manipulation with half of the participants 
instructed to count the number of passes made by a specified team (selected by 
clothing colour). The other half of the participants was instructed to keep two 
separate counts of the number of bounce and aerial passes made by the attended 
team. This high load task involves both an increase in working memory load 
(keeping two tallies instead of one) and an increase in perceptual load (having to 
make perceptual discriminations between the aerial and bounce passes).  
 According to Lavie et al.’s (2004) load theory of attention, the increase in 
working memory load (and therefore cognitive control load) would lead to greater 
detection of the unexpected event because of a lack of cognitive resources to 
control the allocation of attention. However, the increase in perceptual load would 
lead to less detection because perceptual capacity would be entirely taken up with 
the primary task. However, under similar combined load manipulations (described 
earlier) Lavie et al. found perceptual load to take primacy over cognitive load, with 
results supporting the perceptual load predictions. Consistent with the results of 
Lavie et al., Simons and Chabris (1999) report results in support of the perceptual 
load predictions because increasing the task load led to greater IB of the event with 
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55% of participants in the harder condition blind to the unexpected events and only 
35% in the easier condition.  
 Fougnie and Marois (2007) also investigated the effect of working memory 
load on IB. Fougnie and Marois combined a classic Mack and Rock (1998) IB 
cross arm task with a working memory load manipulation, creating a dual task 
situation, similar to that used by Lavie and colleagues. However, unlike Lavie et al. 
who manipulated memory load by increasing memory set size, Fougnie and Marois 
manipulated working memory load by having participants in the low load group 
simply remember a set of five consonants while performing a selective attention 
task, whereas those in the high load group were required to rearrange the set of five 
consonants into alphabetical order, while performing the selective attention task. 
The results of this study were not consistent with the predictions of the cognitive 
control load mechanism presented by Lavie and colleagues (2004); participants in 
the high working memory load condition showed greater rates of IB to the 
unexpected stimulus (68%) than those in the low load condition (35%).  
 To date, the cognitive control load predictions on IB have only been 
investigated by manipulating working memory load. However, semantic activation 
has also been suggested to increase cognitive load (Lavie, 1995), and furthermore 
letter categorisation appears possible only when adequate attentional resources are 
available (Otsuka & Kawaguchi, 2007). The present research seeks to investigate 
the cognitive load predictions of Lavie’s theory on the level of IB using a semantic 
category manipulation of cognitive load using a rapid serial visual presentation 
(RSVP) task, similar to those which have previously been used to investigate other 
perceptual phenomena such as attentional blink, and repetition blindness.  
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The RSVP paradigm  
 A typical RSVP task requires participants to monitor a rapid stream of 
stimuli for targets, to which they must respond as quickly as possible, and is thought 
to tap purely perceptual processes (Mitchell, 1979). In a seminal study, D. 
Broadbent and M. Broadbent (1987) discovered the phenomenon known as 
attentional blink when they used an RSVP task to investigate the identification of 
multiple target words. They found that following the presentation of a target, 
attentional processing is limited and people are often unable to report the items 
following the target, however the item directly following the target usually escapes 
attentional blindness. Therefore, when two targets are presented within 500ms of 
each other and separated by one or more distractors, the second target may fall 
within an attentional blink and be missed. 
 More recently, variations of the RSVP task have been used to investigate IB. 
Rees, Russell, Frith, and Driver (1999) measured brain activity while participants 
viewed rapid displays each consisting of a letter string or word superimposed over a 
picture. Participants were instructed to monitor for repetitions in either the stream of 
letter strings or the stream of pictures being displayed. Rees et al. argued that if 
participants were truly ‘blind’ to unattended stimuli then the brain activation levels 
for words and non-words should be indistinguishable. In contrast, if the ignored 
words are processed then the activation levels to ignored words and non words 
should be discernibly different (Rees et al., 1999). They found no difference in 
activation levels to ignored words and non words, indicating that participants were 
blind to orthographic and/or meaning differences between them. However, Ruz, 
Worden, Tudela, and McCandliss (2005) conducted a replication of the Rees et al. 
study using event-related potentials to measure brain activity instead of fMRI. Their 
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results indicate words continue to be processed even when attention is otherwise 
engaged as different patterns of activity were produced by words and random letters 
strings when ignored. Furthermore, another very close replication of the Rees et al. 
procedures has used a negative priming manipulation to assess the processing of 
ignored words. In this study an ignored picture name impeded the processing of the 
named picture on the next display in 1- and 2-back versions of the picture 
monitoring task (Russell & Neumann, personal communication), indicating that the 
ignored picture name had been processed. 
 Recently, the Rees et al. (1999) RSVP task, along with a rapid serial 
auditory presentation (RSAP) version has been used to investigate IB within and 
across sensory modalities in order to explore the allocation of attentional resources 
(Sinnett, Costa & Soto-Faraco, 2006). However, rather than using brain imaging to 
detect the processing of the unattended stimuli, Sinnett et al. conducted a word 
recognition test at the completion of the ten minute long monitoring task.  
In both unimodal (target and cue were presented in the same modality) visual and 
auditory tasks, participants who attended to the word stream performed significantly 
better on the word recognition test than those who monitored the picture (visual)/ 
animal sound (auditory) stream, indicating IB to the ignored stream. Furthermore, 
participants in the crossmodal conditions (target and cue were presented in the 
different modalities) who attended the word stream (either visual or auditory) 
performed better on the word recognition test than those who monitored the picture 
or sound stream. A comparison of the IB levels between the unimodal and 
crossmodal conditions indicates attentional resources are shared across the sensory 
modalities rather than each of the senses having their own pool of resources. 
However, these conclusions should be treated with caution as a word recognition 
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test at the end of a ten minute long task is not an adequate measure of IB; the words 
could have been perceived but forgotten due to the rapid decay and limited capacity 
of working memory (Mack & Rock, 1998).  
 Scholte, Witteveen, Spekreijse and Lamme (2006) used an RSVP task in 
conjunction with a texture segregation variation of the Mack and Rock (1998) 
‘inattention’ paradigm to investigate the level of scene segmentation processing 
under inattention. The task was to focus on a rapid serial presentation of white and 
black letters. Participants were required to indicate whether the white letters were 
consonants or vowels. In conjunction with the onset of each new white letter, a new 
background texture was presented. Scholte et al. measured brain activity with 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) while 
participants performed the task. Of interest were the differences in brain activity for 
those participants who reported detection of the background texture changes and 
those who failed to detect the texture changes. The results indicated different 
activation levels in early visual area 3a. Importantly, the RSVP task used by Scholte 
et al. successfully induced IB (50%) to background texture changes, suggesting 
letter RSVP tasks can be successfully combined in an IB paradigm and can be used 
to investigate attentional processing.   
  
Aims of the present research 
 The goal of the present research is to investigate the cognitive control 
mechanism of attention proposed by Lavie et al. (2004) using an extension of the 
RSVP IB task used by Scholte et al. (2006). Lavie and colleagues (2004) argue that 
when the demands on the cognitive control mechanism are high, susceptibility to 
distractors is also high (at least in situations of low perceptual load) because the 
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ability to control performance accuracy and behavioural responses is impaired. To 
date, investigations of the cognitive control mechanism have been limited to 
manipulations of working memory load, and studies have found conflicting results. 
Therefore, the cognitive control mechanism is in need of further investigation with a 
variety of manipulations to load cognitive control.  
 Lavie (1995) describes how processes such as “semantic activation, 
memory, response selection, and response execution are conceived as post-
perceptual processes” (page 452). Therefore, a categorisation task involving 
semantic grouping would require semantic activation processes which, being post-
perceptual processes, would load cognitive control resources. The present research 
aims to investigate the predicted cognitive load effects using a categorisation 
manipulation of cognitive control. The low load task requires a simple colour 
classification (red and black), whereas the high load task requires both a colour 
classification and a semantic classification (letter or digit). Jonides and Gleitman 
(1972) have shown letter and digit categorisation to be a post-perceptual process. 
They found the alphanumeric category effect1, seen in visual search research, to be 
due to letter and digit stimuli being recognised as belonging to separate categories, 
rather than due to the subtle perceptual discriminations between the two groups. 
Thus, cognitive load is manipulated in the present research as the high load task 
involves a semantic categorisation of the letter/digit stimuli over and above the 
simple perceptual colour identification of the low load task. 
 The present research uses a new paradigm that combines a variation of the 
RSVP IB task used by Scholte et al. (2006) with the traditional inattention paradigm 
used by Mack and Rock (1998). The paradigm involves participants monitoring a 
                                                 
1 The alphanumeric category effect refers to the visual search effect in which letter (and digit) targets 
are more readily found among digits (and letters) than among other letters (and digits) (Neisser, 
1967).  
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rapid stream of letters and digits. The letters and digits can occur in two different 
colours (red or black) and at either of two locations (left or right of a central fixation 
cross). Participants were required to monitor the RSVP stream and respond to target 
stimuli. The low load task involves selecting targets on the basis of colour 
(responding to red items among black) whereas the high load condition involves 
selecting targets on the basis of both colour and semantic group (responding only to 
red digits among red letters and black letters and digits). On the final display in a 
critical trial, a black word or shape is presented in conjunction with a target or 
distractor in the unoccupied location. Participants are questioned immediately 
following the critical trial regarding detection and identification of the unexpected 
critical stimulus. Of interest is whether levels of IB vary as a function of cognitive 
control load in the direction predicted by Lavie’s load theory of attention: 
participants will be more susceptible to interference from irrelevant distractors 
under high cognitive load conditions than under low cognitive load conditions. 
 A further consideration of the present research is to investigate the detection 
rates of critical stimuli presented in the absence of a target stimulus. Unlike 
previous IB experiments, the present research uses a paradigm which allows the 
critical unexpected stimulus to be presented in conjunction with either a target or 
distractor item. It is possible that IB to unexpected stimuli results not from the 
engagement of attention in a primary task, but from the processes involved in 
response execution (Wolfe, 1999). Previous IB studies have presented the 
unexpected stimulus in conjunction with the primary task and require participants to 
complete response execution for the primary task before they are questioned about 
the unexpected stimulus. For example, a traditional Mack and Rock (1998) cross 
task requires participants to report which of the two cross arms are longer before 
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they are questioned about the unexpected stimulus. It is possible that this process of 
response execution causes ‘amnesia’ of the unexpected stimulus, preventing 
participants from reporting its presence (Wolfe). However, the paradigm used in the 
present research allows for direct investigation of the effect of response execution 
on the rates of IB. The RSVP task allows the unexpected stimulus to be present in 
conjunction with a target item (requires response execution) or a distractor item 
(does not require response execution), and therefore a direct comparison into the 
effect of response execution. 
 
General Method 
 The initial goal was to investigate the effect of visual and later, auditory 
cognitive load on the detection of an unexpected visual or auditory critical stimulus 
using a modification of the Mack and Rock (1998) IB paradigm. This involved 
incorporating a cognitive load manipulation into an RSVP task similar to that used 
by Scholte et al. (2006) and included the proposal to subsequently extend this to a 
rapid serial auditory presentation (RSAP) version (to explore crossmodal 
awareness). However, before the effects of visual load on awareness of an auditory 
critical stimulus can be explored it is necessary to demonstrate first that increasing 
visual cognitive load facilitates reporting of unexpected visual critical stimuli in the 
RSVP task. Because the cognitive load manipulations explored in Experiment 1 had 
no effect on the reporting of visual critical stimuli in the RSVP task the auditory 
aspects of the planned study were not explored. What follows is confined to the 
RSVP task and awareness of unexpected visual critical stimuli. Nevertheless many 
features of the visual task are constrained because initially they were chosen to 
match what was possible in an auditory version. In particular, in order to keep the 
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task conditions constant across all experiments, and allow for comparisons between 
the experiments, auditory stimuli accompanied all visual stimuli in all experiments, 
in the same manner as in Experiment 1. 
 The RSVP task was combined with the Mack and Rock (1998) inattention 
paradigm as follows. Participants completed three RSVP trial sequences in which 
the task was to detect target items. On the fourth trial, the last display included an 
unexpected critical stimulus in addition to a target stimulus. It was expected that 
awareness of the critical stimulus would be increased when the cognitive load of the 
RSVP displays was greater.  
 Participants in the low cognitive load condition performed a feature search 
task where they monitored the 28 stimulus RSVP stream for red items among black 
distractors (in the RSAP task they would have monitored for female voice items 
with male voice distractors). The high load condition employed a conjunction 
search where participants monitored red digits amidst a display containing red and 
black letter and black digit distractors (in the RSAP task they would have monitored 
for digits spoken by a female voice among distractors consisting of letters spoken by 
both a male and a female, as well as digits spoken by a male voice). On the fourth 
experimental trial a visual stimulus (one of three words or two shapes) was 
presented in addition to the final target of the trial (in auditory versions the word 
stimuli would have been spoken).  
 
Participants 
 In all experiments, participants were students at the University of Canterbury 
who took part voluntarily in exchange for a chocolate bar and $2 instant lottery 
ticket. All participants gave signed consent in accord with procedures required by 
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the university Human Ethics committee. Furthermore, all participants were naïve to 
the purpose of the experiment. In order to be included in the data analyses 
participants had to detect the critical stimulus under full attention conditions, and to 
perform the target detection task with an error rate of less than 10%.  
Apparatus and Stimuli 
 All experiments were presented using Superlab for Windows 4.0.3 (Cedrus 
Corporation) with visual stimuli via a 17 inch computer monitor (1024 by 768 
screen resolution and refresh rate of 60Hz). Participants’ viewing distance was 
approximately 50cm from the computer screen, the centre of which was at 
approximately eye level. Target responses and their response times were recorded 
via a mouse (with track ball removed) connected through the COM1 port, and a 
standard 102 key keyboard (keys “x” and “.”) was used to record responses to 
follow-up questions. 
 Visual stimuli for the RSVP task were created using Superlab, and were 
always displayed on a white background. Fixation was indicated by a black cross 
measuring 0.38° visual angle and was presented in the centre of the screen (see 
Figure 1). Visual stimuli were formed from the following set of upper case letters B, 
C, D, E, F, J, K, L, N, P, R, T, X, Y, Z, and digits: 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9. All visual 
stimuli were presented in Arial font in either black or red (RGB 255, 0, 0). From the 
viewing distance visual stimuli had visual angles measuring 0.57° in height and 
0.48° in width measured at the widest point. Stimuli appeared at either the left or 
right of the fixation cross, with horizontal eccentricity of 2.39° (measured from the 
centre of the fixation cross to the centre of the stimulus item). Each trial in an RSVP 
sequence comprised a total of 28 stimulus items. The number of target stimuli per 
trial varied from 3 – 5, and the number of distractors separating the targets varied 
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from 3 – 9.  The final stimulus of each trial was equally likely to be either a target or 
a black distractor. Variation in the number of targets per trial and the nature of the 
final display were designed to reduce expectation that the final display in each trial 
was a target. This was necessary because, in three of the five experiments, the 
critical stimulus in the fourth trial was always presented with the final target of the 
trial. 
 The distractor set for the low load condition consisted of black letters and 
black digits and each target item was equally likely to be a red letter or a red digit 
(see Figure 1). In the high load condition, the distractor set consisted of black 
letters, red letters, and black digits, and all target items were red digits (see Figure 
1). The majority of distractors in both conditions were selected at random with 
replacement from the full set of black letters. In order to keep the two conditions as 
similar as possible, the number of items in each RSVP sequence from the remaining 
distractor sets was restricted. In the low load condition, a maximum of 8 distractor 
items per trial were selected at random with replacement from a restricted pool of 
distractors consisting of a subset of 6 black letters (D, J, N, P, T, X) and the 6 black 
digits. In the high load condition, a maximum of 4 distractors per trial were 
randomly selected with replacement from a pool of distractors consisting of the full 
set of black letters and the full set of red letters. An additional maximum of 4 
distractors were selected at random with replacement from a restricted pool formed 
from the union of 6 black digits and the subset of 6 black letters described above. 
Furthermore, in order to accurately code responses in the high load condition as 
target responses to red digits and not false alarms to red distractor letters, the 
position of the restricted distractor sets in the RSVP sequence was also controlled so 
that they did not occur within two distractor items of a target.  
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Figure 1. Schematic representation of the Low and High load RSVP tasks, targets 
and distractors. 
 Auditory stimuli were presented through two circular speakers located one 
either side of the computer screen at distances of 40cm below the screen, 45cm to 
the right or the left of the screen, and 25cm forward of the screen (all distances are 
measured from the centre of the computer screen and the centre of the speakers). 
The speakers were oriented 45° to face toward the participants head. Auditory 
stimuli were recorded, digitally compressed to 200ms and equated for peak 
amplitude using Cool Edit Pro (Syntrillium Software Corporation). Auditory 
distractor stimuli consisted of the same letter set used for the visual stimuli, and 
were presented in either a male or female voice (both of which were New Zealand 
English speakers) through a left or right speaker with equal probability at 
approximately 60dB.  
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 Each of the visual letter and digit stimuli were randomly paired with an 
auditory stimulus and the pairs would always onset presentation together (for 
example when a red L was displayed on screen, the letter E in a male voice played 
through the left speaker).  
 On the last frame of the fourth 28-frame RSVP trial sequence (see Figure 1) 
a critical stimulus appeared in addition to the final target item which was a red digit 
in both low load and high load conditions. The final target and critical stimulus 
appeared on either side of fixation, with an eccentricity from fixation equal to that 
of the target and distractor stimuli (see Figure 2). The eccentricity of all critical 
stimuli was measured from the centre of the fixation cross to the horizontal centre 
point of the critical stimulus, and measured 2.39°. The critical stimulus was always 
presented with the auditory stimulus “N” in a male voice through a speaker location 
on the same side as the visual target digit (if the digit appeared on the right of the 
fixation cross, the auditory stimulus was also presented on the right). This was 
included in anticipation of conditions involving auditory critical stimulus words and 
pilot studies indicated the auditory word stimuli were best detected under full 
attention circumstances when paired with the letter N over any other letter. 
 
Figure 2. Schematic representation of the visual and auditory presentation of the 
word critical stimulus. 
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Design 
 Mack and Rock’s (1998) inattention paradigm was modified with an RSVP 
so that the effects of cognitive load on the detection of an unexpected visual 
stimulus could be explored. The RSVP task incorporated two levels of cognitive 
load: low load (in which participants were instructed to respond to any red item) and 
high load (in which participants were instructed to respond only to red digits). 
Because the inattention paradigm requires participants to have absolutely no 
expectation that a critical stimulus will appear on the critical trial, a between 
subjects design was used. The location of the critical stimulus was counterbalanced 
across participants so that for half the participants it appeared on the left of fixation, 
and half on the right.  
 
Procedure 
 In each trial the 28 stimulus item RSVP series was preceded by the 
presentation of the central fixation cross (1500ms) which then remained on screen 
throughout the task. Participants were instructed to maintain fixation on the cross 
throughout the trial. Each combination of visual and auditory stimuli was presented 
for 214ms with an inter-stimulus-interval of 50ms. Therefore each pair of stimuli 
would onset approximately 264ms after the onset of the preceding stimulus pair. 
Participants were instructed to push either of the two buttons on the response mouse 
as soon as they saw a target and to make their responses as quickly and as 
accurately as possible. In the low load condition participants were instructed to 
respond to any red item, whereas in the high load condition participants were 
instructed to respond to red digits only. Each trial would end with a blank screen 
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(1500ms) after the presentation of the final stimulus of the trial, followed by 
instructions to begin the next trial. 
 Each participant completed a total of 7 RSVP trial sequences beginning with 
two practice sequences, after each of which they could ask the experimenter 
questions if they did not fully understand the RSVP monitoring task. They then 
completed four experimental trials, the fourth of which was the critical trial where 
the critical stimulus was presented in addition to the fourth and final target for the 
trial. After the presentation of the critical stimulus either a visual mask or blank 
screen is present depending on the experiment (details to be given when 
appropriate). This was followed by a screen asking participants if they saw or heard 
anything different during the last trial. Participants were also instructed to respond 
yes by pressing a designated blue key on the keyboard (“x”) or no by pressing a 
yellow key (“.”). Once a response was made a second screen instructed participants 
to describe the difference they saw or heard as specifically as possible in writing on 
paper provided, or to write NA if they did not notice anything different about the 
last display.  
 Once participants had finished writing, the experimenter instructed them to 
press the space bar which then presented the instructions for the final full attention 
trial (the fifth experimental RSVP trial sequence). Participants were instructed not 
to complete the target monitoring task or make any responses. Instead they were 
instructed to determine if a visual critical stimulus (identified as word or shape 
depending on the experiment) had been presented on screen and to identify the 
stimulus (word or shape) (this was to encourage them to actively remember the 
stimulus because pilot studies had indicated that participants may notice the word, 
but quickly forget its identity). Participants were instructed to maintain visual 
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fixation on the cross during the full attention trial. The full attention trial was 
identical to the critical trial with the same critical stimulus appearing at the same 
location as it had in the critical trial. Following the presentation of the full attention 
trial, a screen was presented instructing participants that if they saw a stimulus 
(word or shape) they should record it on the paper and press the blue keyboard key. 
Alternatively, if they did not see a stimulus, they were instructed to write NA and 
press the yellow key. Only participants who reported the correct stimulus on these 
trials were included in the data analysis. 
 
Experiment 1 
 The purpose of Experiment 1 was first to demonstrate inattentional blindness 
to a word critical stimulus in an RSVP task, as well as to investigate the effect of 




 A total of 26 participants took part in Experiment 1. Data from one 
participant were excluded from analyses because of failure to detect the critical 
stimulus word under full attention conditions, and data from a second participant 
were excluded due to an error rate of 13%. This left a total 24 participants (7 male, 
mean age = 22 years, range = 17-43 years), with 12 in each of the two load 
conditions. 
 Apparatus and Stimuli 
 The apparatus for the presentation of the visual and auditory stimuli were the 
same as described in the General Method. The low and high oad tasks were those 
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described in the General Method as we all target and distractor stimuli in the RSVP 
task. The critical stimuli used in Experiment 1 were the 4 letter words: CAKE, 
DUST and CORK (chosen due to their auditory clarity) presented visually in upper 
case. The words were presented in the same font and size as the letter and digit 
stimuli casting a visual angle of 2.96° when viewed at 50cm. The words were 
presented at either side of the fixation cross with the centre of the word measuring 
2.39° from the centre of fixation (equal to the target and distractor stimuli). Each of 
the critical stimulus words was presented to an equal number of participants. 
 Procedure 
 The procedure was identical to that described in the General Method with 
the added detail that the presentation of the critical stimulus word was followed by a 
1500ms blank screen to allow responses to the final target to be made. The 1500ms 
blank screen is modelled on Mack and Rock’s (1998) experiments with IB to word 
critical stimuli.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 In order to investigate the effects of cognitive load on the rate of IB, it is 
necessary to demonstrate first that a considerable proportion of participants failed to 
detect the critical stimulus when their attention was engaged elsewhere, and that 
cognitive load had been successfully manipulated such that the high load task was 
significantly more taxing than the low load task.  
 Word IB levels across both groups indicate that IB has been successfully 
demonstrated (see Table 1). In all experiments, IB to the critical stimulus is 
categorised at two levels: those who fail to detect any additional visual stimulus are 
categorised as having been ‘blind’ to the stimulus; and those who either correctly 
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detect and identify the stimulus, or report detection specifically of a visual word 
(given that the question only asked if there participants saw or heard a difference) 
are categorised as ‘not blind’.  
 Across both the high and low load conditions 29% (7/24) were blind to the 
critical stimulus word. This is a considerably high level of IB, and is comparable to 
the 25% IB of a solid square critical stimulus reported by Mack and Rock (1998) in 
their cross arm length judgment task. Therefore, we can conclude that IB has been 
successfully demonstrated in the current RSVP task. 
 Analysis of target response times and error rates indicates that the load 
manipulation was effective. A straightforward way to treat the target response times 
would be to simply compute the median target response times for each participant 
and then compare the means for the two load groups. However it is necessary to 
exclude responses made to targets presented on the very last display of each RSVP 
sequence because, unlike other targets, these responses are made in the absence of 
following displays and distractor items. Also, responses made to targets appearing 
shortly before the final display may also still be in progress after the last display. 
Therefore only responses to targets made prior to the onset of the 1500ms blank 
screen, of which there were 13 (in Experiments 1-3, 14 in Experiments 4-5) were 
used to calculate the median response time for each participant.  
 Errors were categorised as either misses or false alarms. Misses occurred 
either when there was no response to a target, or a response occurred within 100ms 
of target presentation or more than 800ms following the onset of the target. False 
alarms were defined as responses made to distractors or responses made more than 
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800ms after the offset of a target.2 Statistica 7.0 (Statsoft) software was used to 
calculate all statistics. 
 In Experiment 1, on average, participants in the low load condition 
responded to targets faster (M = 404ms, SD = 23.4ms) than those in the high load 
condition (M = 440ms, SD = 19ms), t(22) = 4.22, p = .0004. There was no 
significant difference in accuracy between the low load (M = 1.4%, SD = 1.4%) and 
high load conditions (M = 1.9%, SD = 1.6%), t(22) =0.92, p = .37. However, 
because more errors occurred in the high load condition (with the longer response 
time) than low load condition, there are no speed accuracy trade-off concerns. 
Overall the error and RT results indicate a significant task difficulty effect and 
successful manipulation of cognitive load. 
 While both a considerable level of IB and a successful task manipulation 
have been demonstrated, there is no evidence of an effect of cognitive load on the 
level of IB. Table 1 provides a summary of the IB levels averaged over the three 
critical stimulus words presented under low and high load conditions. 
 The IB levels indicate little variation between the two load groups. A one-
tailed Fisher’s Exact test yielded no significant difference between the two load 
groups (p = .5). Therefore, although the RSVP task has produced levels of IB 
comparable with those reported by Mack and Rock (1998) and despite a significant 
task difficulty effect, there is no evidence that cognitive load has influenced the rate 
                                                 
2 In Experiments 1-3 each participant was presented 13 response timed targets, and therefore 13 miss 
errors were possible per participant; and in Experiments 4-5, 14 response timed targets were 
presented thus allowing a possible 14 miss errors. There were 96 displays across all participants that 
did not contain a target and to which responses could potentially be classified as false alarms.  
However because responses occurring between 100 and 800 ms following a target are classified as 
target hits, purely distractor displays occurring within that window in the sequence must be excluded 
from those to which false alarms can potentially occur. Consequently, false alarms could occur on 
not more than 60 trials. 
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of detection of a critical word stimulus when presented unexpectedly and 
concurrently with a target in the RSVP task. 
 
Table 1 
Percentage of IB to critical stimulus words under conditions of low and 
high cognitive load in Experiments 1, 2, and 3.  
  
 Low Load High Load Average 
 
Experiment 1: word 25.0 33.0 29.0 
 
Experiment 2:  75.0 88.0 81.0 
 
Experiment 3:  62.5 100.0 81.0 
  
 The results of this experiment are inconsistent with the predicted effects of 
cognitive load. Furthermore, the visual angle width of the word critical stimulus was 
much greater than that cast by the target and distractor letters (2.96° and 0.48° 
respectively). In order to control for this problem, the remaining experiments use 
two shape stimuli equal in size to the RSVP letter and digit stimuli. Experiment 2 
uses a black outline square as the critical stimulus, and Experiment 3 uses a solid 
black square critical stimulus.  
 Furthermore, in their investigations of word detection Mack and Rock 
(1998) followed the critical word stimulus with a 1500ms blank screen, and in their 
investigations of shape detection, the critical shape stimulus was followed by a 
500ms visual mask. Therefore, in the following experiments using shape critical 





 A total of sixteen participants took part in Experiment 2 (N = 16, 2 males, 
mean age = 23.4 years, range = 19-39 years).  
 Apparatus and Stimuli 
 The apparatus for the presentation of the visual and auditory stimuli were the 
same as described in the General Method as were the high and low load tasks and 
all stimuli with the exception of the critical stimulus. Experiment 1 used three 
words: cake, dust and cork as critical word stimuli. However in Experiment 2, the 
critical shape stimulus was a black outline square that subtended 0.48° in visual 
angle, which is equal to the width of the letter and digit stimuli. The critical stimulus 
outline square was presented with a visual angle eccentricity of 2.39°, measured 
from the centre point of the fixation to the centre point of the square. Unlike 
Experiment 1, a visual mask made up of black, white, and grey squares and 
rectangles was used in Experiment 2.  
 Procedure 
 The procedure for Experiment 2 was the same as described in the General 
Method with the added detail that a 500ms visual mask immediately followed the 
presentation of the critical stimulus. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 Experiment 2 demonstrated a high level of IB with 13 (81%) of 16 
participants failing to detect the critical shape stimulus. Therefore, IB of a black 
outline square has been successfully demonstrated.  
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 In Experiment 2 there was also a significant difference in task difficulty 
between the low and high cognitive load conditions. The high load condition had 
significantly longer response times (M = 446ms, SD = 18.7ms) than the low load 
condition (M = 391ms, SD = 34.9ms), t(14) = 3.94, p =.002. No significant 
difference in error rates was found, t(14) = 1.0, p = .34. There is no evidence of a 
speed accuracy trade-off. Thus there is sufficient evidence to conclude that task 
difficulty has been successfully manipulated. 
 Consistent with Experiment 1, the IB level results of the present experiment 
indicate no effect of cognitive load on the detection of a black outline square when 
it is presented unexpectedly. Table 1 provides a summary of the IB levels for the 
critical shape stimulus under low and high load conditions. A high proportion of 
participants in both the low and high load conditions (6 of 8 participants, and 7 of 8 
participants respectively) failed to detect the critical stimulus. The difference in IB 
levels failed to reach significance, p = .5 (one-tailed) using the Fisher Exact test. It 
can therefore be concluded that not only is cognitive load found to have no effect on 
the detection of an unexpected word in a RSVP task, but neither does it have an 
effect on the detection of an unexpected outline square shape stimulus. 
The original demonstration of IB by Mack and Rock (1998) used a black solid 
square rather than a black outline square. Experiment 3 is identical to Experiment 2 





 A total of twenty participants took part in Experiment 3. The data from four 
participants was excluded from further analysis because they failed to detect the 
critical stimulus in the full attention condition. This left 16 participants in 
Experiment 3 (N = 16, 5 male, mean age = 20.9 years, range = 18-27 years).  
 Apparatus and Stimuli 
 The apparatus for the presentation of the visual and auditory stimuli were the 
same as described in the General Method as were the high and low load tasks. All 
visual stimuli in Experiment 3 were identical to those described in the General 
Method. A solid black square shape with a visual angle of 0.48° served as the 
critical stimulus. The presentation of the critical stimulus was followed by a 500ms 
visual mask, modelled on that used by Mack and Rock (1998) in their investigations 
of IB to a shape critical stimulus. 
 Procedure 
 The procedure of Experiment 3 was identical to that described in the General 
Method with the added details of the critical stimulus and visual mask described 
above. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 Consistent with the results of Experiment 2, Experiment 3 also demonstrated 
a high level of IB as 13 (81%) of 16 participants were blind to the critical and 
unexpected solid black square stimulus.  
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 Cognitive load as calculated by a task difficulty effect has also been 
successfully demonstrated. The low cognitive load condition produced significantly 
faster response times (M = 399ms, SD = 16.5ms) than did the high cognitive load 
condition (M = 446ms, SD = 55ms), as indicated by a one-tailed t-test, t(14) = 2.32, 
p = .048.  Error rates in the high load condition (M = 2.1%, SD = 2.8%) were not 
significantly different to those produced in the low load condition (M = 1.9%, SD = 
1.8%), t(14) = 0.14, p = .88. There is no evidence of a speed accuracy trade-off. 
From these results, we are able to conclude that task difficulty has been successfully 
manipulated. 
 Consistent with previous experiments, the present experiment also failed to 
find a significant effect of cognitive load on the level of IB of an unexpected critical 
stimulus (see Table 1). Furthermore, the present results indicate a slight trend 
opposite in direction to the predicted effect derived from Lavie et al. (2004) with all 
8 participants of the high load condition blind to the critical stimulus, but only 5 of 
the 8 low load participants were blind (see Table 1). However, this difference failed 
to reach significance using a one-tailed Fisher Exact test (p = .1). Therefore, 
considering these results and those of the previous experiments, we are unable to 
conclude support for a cognitive load effect on the detection of a critical stimulus 
that occurs unexpectedly and at the same time as a target stimulus.  
 A between experiment comparison of the overall IB rates found in 
Experiments 2 and 3 was conducted to determine whether filled and outline shapes 
varied in their propensity to produce IB. No difference between IB levels to a black 
outline square critical stimulus and a solid black square stimulus of the same 
dimensions was expected. As seen in Table 1, this hypothesis was supported as the 
two critical stimulus shapes had identical IB rates of 81%.  
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 While there is no difference in IB levels between to the outline and solid 
critical shape stimuli, significantly more participants were blind to a critical shape 
stimulus than to a critical word stimulus (see Table 1). This difference in magnitude 
of IB is most likely due to the difference in size and saliency between the shapes 
and words. The critical shape stimuli cast visual angle widths of 0.48° whereas the 
visual angle of the critical word stimuli was 2.96°. Therefore, the word stimuli were 
more salient than the shapes, and had a greater sudden onset effect as much of the 
area they occupied was blank in all previous trials. Letters and digits are also more 
similar in nature to words than to geometric shapes. Therefore the word critical 
stimuli may have been in the attentional set (Most et al., 2005; Most et al., 2001) of 
the task leading to greater detection than the shape stimuli. Furthermore, recent 
research (Chen & Treisman, manuscript under review) has suggested that stimuli 
have a greater capacity to capture attention as their eccentricity increases. Therefore, 
as both the word and shape stimuli were presented with equal eccentricities from 
fixation that were measured from their centres, absolute eccentricity (from fixation 
to the word’s widest point) of the word stimuli (3.87°) is greater than that of the 
shape stimuli (2.63°). Therefore, word stimuli have greater eccentricity, saliency 
and are related to the attentional set, thus they captured attention at a greater rate 
than the smaller critical shape stimuli. 
 
Experiment 4 
 Experiments 1-3 all investigate IB to a critical stimulus that occurs at the 
same time as a target stimulus. Critical stimulus onset with a target is a situation 
consistent with all previous IB experiments in which the critical stimulus is 
presented while the participant is actively occupied in performing the target task, for 
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example judging which line is the longer of the two in a cross formation (see Mack 
& Rock, 1998). Participants are then required to make their response before they are 
questioned about detection of the critical stimulus. It is possible that the failure to 
report the critical stimulus occurs because the processes involved in executing the 
response to the target (after the critical stimulus presentation) lead to amnesia 
(failure to remember) of the presentation of the critical stimulus (Wolfe, 1999); 
rather than a failure of pre-attentive and selection processes to detect it, as is implied 
by the term IB. In order to investigate this possibility Experiments 4 and 5 no longer 
present the critical stimulus in conjunction with a target, or during an attentional 
blink period (500ms) following a target, but instead present the critical stimulus 




 A total of eight students participated in Experiment 4 (3 male, mean age = 
20.9 years, range = 19-24 years). In order to be included in analyses in Experiments 
4 and 5, it was necessary for participants to respond to the final target of the critical 
trial prior to the onset of the critical stimulus. All participants in both Experiments 4 
and 5 met this criterion and are included in the analyses. 
 Apparatus and Stimuli 
 The apparatus for the presentation of the visual and auditory stimuli were the 
same as described in the General Method as were the high and low cognitive load 
tasks. All stimuli were identical to those described in the General Method with the 
added details of a 500ms visual mask following the final display of the RSVP 
stream, and the critical stimulus was a black outline square. 
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 Procedure 
 The procedure was identical to that described in the General Method with 
two exceptions. Due to a programming error participants were mistakenly instructed 
that distractors and targets could occur at any of four locations: above, below, to the 
left or to the right of the fixation cross. However, targets and distractors continued 
to occur only in the same two locations to the left and right of fixation that were 
used in previous experiments. Secondly, the critical stimulus was no longer 
presented simultaneously with the final target of the critical trial. Instead the outline 
black square critical stimulus onset occurred simultaneously with a black distractor 
letter but only after two distractors had followed the previous target. This resulted in 
a 528ms period separating the onset of the last target and the onset of the critical 
stimulus. The goal here was to ensure that the critical stimulus did not occur within 
an attentional blink (or response period) following the final target of the critical 
trial. To ensure that the results reflect IB to a critical stimulus outside of a response 
period participants who failed to respond to the final target prior to the presentation 
of the critical stimulus were excluded from analyses. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 Consistent with the previous results, task difficulty was again successfully 
manipulated. Mean response times under high cognitive load conditions (M = 
482ms, SD = 65ms) were longer than those under low load conditions (M = 406ms, 
SD = 6.9ms) a difference that was almost significant, as indicated by a one-tailed t-
test, t(6) = 2.32, p =.06. Furthermore, there was no significant difference in 
accuracy between the high (M = 1.4%, SD = 1.6%) and low load conditions (M = 
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0.7%, SD = 1.4%), t(6) = 0.66, p = .26. Speed accuracy trade-off is not an issue, and 
task difficulty has been successfully manipulated. 
 It is not possible to investigate an effect of cognitive load on levels of IB in 
the present experiments because, in contrast to all previous experiments that found 
considerable levels of IB to the critical stimulus, virtually no IB occurred in the 
present experiment (see Table 2). Of the 8 participants, only 1 person (low load) 
was blind to the black outline square when it appeared unexpectedly with a 
distractor and outside the previous targets response period.  
 
Table 2 
Percentage of IB to critical stimuli when presented in conjunction with a 
target or a distractor under low and high cognitive load conditions. 
  
 Low Load High Load Average 
Expt 2: 
Target onset  75.0 88.0 81.0  
Expt 4: 
Distractor onset  25.0 0.0 12.5 
Expt 3:  
Target onset  62.5 100.0 81.0 
Expt 5: 
Distractor onset  63.0 88.0 75.0 
  
 A between experiment comparison of the IB levels found in Experiment 2 
and those found in the present experiment allows us to evaluate the hypothesis that 
it is the attentional processes and not the demands of generating a response that lead 
to IB. If IB is due to attentional rather than response processes, then the conditions 
under which the critical stimulus is presented (either with a target and immediately 
prior to a response period; or onset with a distractor following a response period) 
will have no effect on levels of IB to a black outline square critical stimulus. Table 2 
provides a summary of the IB levels for when the critical stimulus is accompanied 
by a target or a distractor. Under conditions of onset with a target and followed by a 
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target response period (Experiment 2), 81% of participants (13/16) are blind to the 
critical stimulus. However, under conditions of onset with a distractor outside of a 
target response period (Experiment 4), only 12.5% (1/8) participants are blind to the 
critical stimulus. Distractor onset conditions relative to onset with a target appear to 
have significantly decreased the level of IB to an unexpected critical stimulus (two-
tailed Fisher’s Exact test, p =.002). This suggests that it is the demands of response 
execution and not pre-attentive selection processes that lead to amnesia of critical 
stimulus in attentional IB experiments. 
 However, there is an alternative explanation for these results. Due to a fault 
in programming, participants were mistakenly instructed that distractors and targets 
could occur at four possible locations instead of the actual two. This instruction is 
likely to have broadened the spatial area of attention, increasing susceptibility to 
additional stimuli. Furthermore, the contradiction between the instructions of the 
task and the reality of the task may have further increased susceptibility of 
participants to unexpected changes. Therefore, from the results of the present 
experiment, it is not possible to draw strong conclusions about the changes in IB 
levels and their relationship to the conditions of critical stimulus onset: whether it is 
presented with a target or distractor item.  
 
Experiment 5 
 Experiment 5 offers a means to clarifying the interpretation of the results of 
Experiment 4, and further explores the relationship between IB to a critical stimulus 
and whether the critical stimulus is present with a target or distractor item. The 
present experiment replicates the distractor critical onset procedure used in 
Experiment 4, with two alterations. Firstly, participants were correctly instructed of 
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the two (not four) location monitoring task, which allows for investigation of the 
possibility that the instructions led to a broadening of the size of the attentional 
field. Secondly, a solid black square critical stimulus was used instead of a black 
outline square. This was to allow for a direct comparison with the results of 
Experiment 3, and is not considered a problematic difference from Experiment 4 as 
the comparison of IB levels in Experiments 2 and 3 have indicated no evidence of 




 Eighteen students took part in Experiment 5. Data from two participants was 
excluded because of failure to detect the critical stimulus under full attention 
conditions. This left 16 participants (3 male, mean age = 24.4 years, range = 19-38 
years).  
 Apparatus and Stimuli 
 The apparatus for the presentation of the visual and auditory stimuli were the 
same as described in the General Method as were the high and low cognitive load 
tasks. All stimuli were identical to those described in the General Method and used 
a black solid square shape critical stimulus followed by a visual mask presented for 
500ms. 
 Procedure 
 The procedure was identical to that described in the General Method with 
the exceptions of the critical stimulus black solid square that would occur under 
distractor rather than target conditions. Note, unlike Experiment 4, participants were 
correctly instructed of the two location RSVP task. 
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Results and Discussion 
 In contrast with Experiment 4, the present experiment successfully 
demonstrated a considerable level of IB to the black solid square critical stimulus 
when it was presented in conjunction with a distractor but outside the response 
period of a prior target (see Table 2). Of the 16 participants, 12 (75%) failed to 
detect the critical stimulus under distractor conditions. When compared with the IB 
levels to the same critical stimulus under target presentation conditions (Experiment 
3), no significant difference was found (two-tailed Fisher’s Exact test, p = 1). Table 
2 provides a summary of the IB levels to a black solid square critical stimulus under 
target (81%, Experiment 3) and distractor presentation conditions (75%, present 
experiment). Unlike those of the Experiment 2 and 4 comparison, these results 
suggest it is not the effort involved in making a response that leads to a failure to 
detect an unexpected black solid square critical stimulus, but rather the engagement 
of attentional processes in monitoring an RSVP task.  
 Experiments 4 and 5 differed in two ways: their critical stimulus (black 
outline square and black solid square respectively), and the instructions given to 
participants. The comparison of the IB levels in Experiments 2 and 3 reported 
earlier indicate no significant difference in IB patterns for the two different critical 
stimuli, therefore any difference in the IB patterns for Experiments 4 and 5 can be 
considered to be representative of an effect of the instructions given. Table 2 
provides a summary of the IB results for Experiments 4 in which IB was nearly 
eliminated under instructions that stimuli could occur at four rather than the actual 
two locations; and Experiment 5 which found considerable IB to a black solid 
square under correct location monitoring instructions. The IB levels in Experiment 4 
is significantly greater than that in Experiment 5 using the Fisher Exact test (two-
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tailed, p = .006). This result suggests that the difference in instructions had a 
significant effect on the levels of IB to a critical stimulus under distractor conditions 
and this finding contradicts the explanation offered following Experiment 4 that 
lack of IB in that experiment occurred because the onset of the critical stimulus did 
not occur with a target which required an overt response to be made.  
 As with previous experiments both the mean response times and error rates 
of the high load condition (M = 441ms, SD = 31.4ms, M = 2%, SD = 1.3%) were 
greater than those of the low load condition (M = 405ms, SD = 20.8ms, M = 1.7%, 
SD = 1.2%), with the response times difference reaching significance in a one-tail t-
test, t(14) = 2.73, p = .016. While the difference in error rates failed to reach 
significance, the direction of the difference indicates speed accuracy trade-off is not 
an issue.  
 While Experiment 5 provides evidence supportive of a task manipulation, 
there is no effect of load on the level of IB to the solid square stimulus (see Table 2) 
as no significant difference in IB levels is found between the high and low load 
conditions (one-tailed Fisher’s Exact test, p = .28).  
 It was hypothesised that greater levels of IB to an unexpected critical 
stimulus would occur under conditions of low cognitive load than under high 
cognitive load in the current RSVP monitoring task. However, no significant load 
effect was found in any of the experiments reported, regardless of stimulus type 
(word versus shape) or whether the critical stimulus occurred with a target or 
distractor item. When the IB results of all five experiments are collated and a 
comparison conducted between low and high load conditions (see Table 3 for 
summary) the trend is in the opposite direction to the expected cognitive load effect 
with the high load condition producing an overall IB level of 65% (26/40) while the 
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low load condition produced a 50% (20/40) IB level. However, this difference failed 
to reach significance (one-tailed, Fisher’s Exact test, p = .13) and therefore there is 
no conclusive evidence of an effect of cognitive load in the detection of an 
unexpected stimulus.  
 
Table 3 
Percentage of IB to critical stimuli across all experiments, 
under conditions of low and high cognitive load.  
 
 Low Load High Load 
 
% IB 50 65 
 
General Discussion 
 The present research aimed to investigate the effect of cognitive load on the 
detection of unexpected stimuli in an RSVP task. In order to do so, it is necessary to 
demonstrate inattentional blindness to unexpected stimuli in an RSVP task. The task 
used in the present research required participants to monitor an RSVP stream 
containing both red and black letters and digits which were presented randomly 
either side of a central fixation cross. On the final display of the critical trial, an 
unexpected stimulus was presented in conjunction with either a target or a distractor 
item. Four of the five experiments reported above demonstrated considerably high 
levels of inattentional blindness (ranging from 29% to 81% IB) to the unexpected 
stimulus. Therefore, the IB results of the present research provide strong evidence 
that the RSVP method used by the present research can be successfully used for 
investigating inattentional blindness. 
 The levels of IB found in the present research are very high in comparison to 
those found in the original Mack and Rock (1998) studies. In the present research, 
word critical stimuli produced IB levels of 29%, and shape critical stimuli, produced 
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IB levels of 75% to 81%. Using the ‘inattention’ paradigm and the cross line-length 
task, Mack and Rock (1998) found only 25% IB to shape critical stimuli. There is a 
marked increase in IB levels in the results of the present research, and there are 
several possible explanations. The present research used a two-location RSVP task 
as the primary selective attention task instead of the cross task. Because participants 
were required to monitor two locations instead of one, the RSVP task may have 
been more demanding on attentional resources than the cross task, leading to 
reduced detection of critical stimuli.  
  A second possible explanation for the high levels of IB found in the present 
research in comparison to those found in previous research is the attentional set 
relationship between the attended items and the unexpected stimulus. Using the 
‘selective looking’ paradigm, Most et al. (2005) have demonstrated that unexpected 
stimuli similar to or within the same attentional set (for example, the same colour) 
as the target items are detected by 94% of participants, whereas only 6% of 
participants detect critical stimuli similar to the distractor set. Mack and Rock 
(1998) combined a black cross attended item with a black solid square critical 
stimulus, resulting in 25% IB. However, Cartwright-Finch and Lavie (2007) 
combined a green and blue version of the Mack and Rock cross task with a black 
outline critical stimulus and found a high 90% IB rate (when participants performed 
a line length discrimination task with the cross). The difference in IB levels in these 
two studies is likely to be due to the relationship between the attentional task and 
the critical stimulus. Mack and Rock’s black critical stimulus was in the same 
attentional colour set as their black cross task, whereas Cartwright-Finch and 
Lavie’s black critical stimulus was outside the blue and green attentional set of their 
cross task. Similarly, the present research combined black critical stimuli with black 
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distractor items, and red target items. Thus, the critical stimuli of the present 
research were within the distractor set. Therefore, it is possible that the increase in 
IB level found in the present research is due to the relationship of the critical 
stimulus to the attentional and distractor sets used in the task.  
 Furthermore, it is possible to argue that the critical stimulus may have been 
further away from the locus of attention in the RSVP task than in the cross task. In 
the present research, the critical stimulus occurred 2.39° from the central fixation 
point which is similar to the critical stimulus used by Mack and Rock (1998) which 
was presented 2.30° from fixation. However, in Mack and Rock’s cross task, 
fixation was located at the centre of the cross, and the cross also occupied the locus 
(or spotlight) of attention. In contrast, the RSVP task requires two locations to be 
monitored, each 2.39° from fixation. When the critical stimulus was presented, it 
occupied one of the locations, and a task item (either target or distractor) occupied 
the other, meaning a 4.78° separation between the items. Therefore, if the monitored 
item occupies the attended location, and then the critical stimulus may have been 
too far away to capture attention.  
 However, there are at least two reasons why the last argument may not 
comprise a valid explanation for the high rates of IB in the current experiments. 
Firstly, Chen and Treisman (manuscript under review) have recently found 
distractor interference to increase with eccentricity. In which case, if the above 
argument were true, the task used in the present study should have produced greater, 
not less, detection of the unexpected stimulus than previous research. Secondly, due 
to the nature of the RSVP task, it is not known in advance which of the two 
locations will contain the task item, therefore both locations are likely to be attended 
(either under a single attentional spotlight that encompasses both, or two small 
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spotlights around each location). If both locations are attended, then the critical 
stimulus would have fallen within the focus of attention, similar to those used in 
Mack and Rock (1998). Thus, the increase in IB levels in the present research 
relative to previous studies is unlikely to be a result of increased eccentricity. 
  
The cognitive load effect 
 While the present research demonstrated high levels of inattentional 
blindness using an RSVP task, it failed to find evidence of an effect of cognitive 
load on IB. According to the load theory of attention and cognitive control proposed 
by Lavie and her colleagues (2004), increases in cognitive load should lead to 
greater distractor interference and hence less IB to unexpected stimuli. The present 
experiment varied the cognitive load of the primary task by manipulating the basis 
upon which participants selected targets from the RSVP stream. In the low load 
condition, targets were selected on the basis of a colour judgment, which is a simple 
perceptual discrimination requiring little cognitive control. In contrast, the high load 
group selected targets on the basis of both colour and semantic category, requiring a 
higher level of cognitive processing and control. Although reaction time and 
accuracy measures indicated a successful manipulation of load, this difference in 
cognitive load was not reflected in levels of inattentional blindness to unexpected 
stimuli. No significant cognitive load effects were found in any of the five 
experiments, nor was there one when all five experiments were collated. These 
results are inconsistent with the predictions Lavie’s cognitive control load theory. 
 Support for the cognitive load effect has been gained from Lavie et al. 
(2004) who used a set size working memory load manipulation in conjunction with 
a selective attention task to investigate the effect of cognitive load on distractor 
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interference. They found distractor interference was greater in the large memory set 
size condition than in the small memory set size. However, much of the other 
research investigating the effects of cognitive load has failed to find support for 
Lavie’s cognitive control load theory and its predictions. Two IB studies found 
increases in cognitive load to produce greater levels of IB (Fougnie & Marois, 2007; 
Simons & Chabris, 1999) contrary to Lavie’s predictions. Similarly, although the 
present research did not find any significant load effects, the trend is consistent with 
previous research; more participants were blind to the critical stimulus in the high 
cognitive load condition (65%) than the low cognitive load condition (50%). 
 Furthermore, unlike the tasks used to investigate perceptual load, the task 
used by Lavie et al. (2004) to investigate cognitive load did not incorporate the load 
manipulation into the selective attention task itself. Instead, a dual task situation was 
created in which an unrelated working memory task (in which cognitive load was 
manipulated) was combined with a selective attention task. Therefore, the results 
may not reflect the effects of the cognitive load of the primary task, but the effect of 
dividing cognitive functioning between two tasks. The task used in the present 
research along with the task used by Simons and Chabris (1999) both manipulated 
cognitive load in single task situations, and both report results inconsistent with 
Lavie et al.’s (2004) cognitive load predictions. Therefore, it is possible that the 
cognitive control mechanism and its load effect as predicted by Lavie et al. is 
limited to dual task situations which heavily load verbal working memory.  
 Furthermore, neither cognitive nor perceptual load effects have been 
demonstrated in a situation in which the distractor items and/or unexpected stimuli 
(in the case of IB research) occur at an attended location as is the case in the task 
used by the current research. Two studies investigated load effects on Stroop 
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interference using a Stroop task (which ensured both target and distractor 
information belonged to the same object, and therefore occupied the same location). 
Contrary to the predictions of Lavie’s perceptual load theory, Chen (2003) found 
increasing the perceptual load of the Stroop task led to greater Stroop interference. 
Similarly, Gao, Chen and Russell, (2007) found that increasing working memory 
load while performing a Stroop task had no effect on the level of Stroop 
interference. The present study failed to find an effect of cognitive load on the 
detection of an unexpected stimulus that occurred at an attended location. Therefore, 
it is possible that the effects of both perceptual and cognitive load are limited to 
situations in which distractor items and unexpected events occur at non-attended 
locations. 
 Although the task used in the present research has strength by investigating 
cognitive load in a single (not dual) task situation, it could be argued that the load 
manipulation does not involve a variation in cognitive control load alone. The 
present research manipulated cognitive control load by having half of the 
participants select targets from an RSVP sequence on the basis of colour, and half 
on the basis of a colour and semantic categorisation conjunction. Lavie et al.’s 
(2004) theory argues that the cognitive control mechanism is involved in selection 
when the perceptual load of the task is low. In their investigation into the effect of 
perceptual load on IB levels, Cartwright-Finch and Lavie (2007) used a colour 
distinction task as a low perceptual load task. Therefore, the colour based selection 
of targets from an RSVP sequence used as a low cognitive load task in the present 
research can also be categorised as low perceptual load (as is necessary with for 
investigating Lavie’s cognitive control mechanism). It could be argued that the high 
cognitive load task of the present research involves an increase in perceptual load as 
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participants are required to select targets based on both colour and letter/digit 
category. However, (as mentioned in the introduction) Jonides and Gleitman (1972) 
demonstrated that the differences in the processing of letters and digits are due to 
their separate categories rather than due to the perceptual differences between them. 
Therefore, although the perceptual load between the two cognitive load groups in 
the present research may not be entirely equal, the difference is negligible in 
comparison to the difference in cognitive load.  
 Furthermore, although the present research involves an increase in the depth 
of cognitive processing required, it could be argued that it is not an increase in 
cognitive control load. While the semantic categorisation of letters and digits 
involves cognitive processing, cognitive control is also involved as participants in 
the high cognitive control load condition of the present research also have to inhibit 
responses to red non-target items. Participants in the low cognitive control load 
condition are required to make selections based on an early perceptual process and 
are only required to respond to any red item; therefore little response control is 
required to inhibit responses to black distractor items. In contrast, participants in the 
high cognitive control condition are required to respond only to red digits. They first 
have to select items early on a perceptual basis of red, and then categorise the red 
items as either letter or digit. Therefore, a greater level of cognitive control is 
required to inhibit responses to not only all black distractor items, but more so to the 
red letter distractor items. Thus, the present research has successfully manipulated 
cognitive control load in a single selective attention task situation, and has found no 
evidence of an effect of cognitive control load on the detection of an unexpected 
critical stimulus. 
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 Perhaps the greatest limitation of the present research is an underestimation 
of the important role that attentional set plays in selective attention. Most and 
colleagues (Most et al., 2005; Most et al., 2001) have demonstrated the influential 
role that attentional set can play in selective attention in their investigations with 
sustained IB. They have shown that participants are more likely to detect an 
unexpected stimulus when it is similar to the attentional set of the primary task, and 
least likely to be detected with it is similar to the distractor set of the primary task. 
The present research neglected to consider the importance of the relationship 
between the unexpected critical stimulus and the attentional and distractor sets of 
the primary task. It is possible that the present research failed to find an effect of 
cognitive load because the critical stimulus was more similar to the distractor set of 
the primary task than to the attended set. The critical stimulus was always black, 
and in both low and high cognitive load conditions, the target items of the primary 
task were always red, and all black items were always distractors. Because both the 
high and low cognitive load conditions of the present research involved selecting 
red items (specifically red digits in the high cognitive load), it is likely that the 
critical stimulus always got discounted from selection at the same early level of 
perceptual selection in both the low and high load conditions. Therefore, the effect 
of cognitive load may have been masked by the relationship between the critical 
stimulus and the attentional and distractor sets of the primary task. This possibility 
could easily be explored by investigating the detection of an attended set critical 





Limitations of Lavie’s load theory of attention and cognitive control 
 While investigating the effect of cognitive control load on the detection of 
an unexpected stimulus the present research has also highlighted several limitations 
of Lavie’s theory of attention, the first of which is her neglect to address the role of 
attentional set in the processing of irrelevant distractors. Comparisons of the IB 
levels found by Mack and Rock (1998), Cartwright-Finch and Lavie (2007), and in 
the present research clearly illustrates the extent to which attentional set can 
influence the detection of unexpected stimuli. As described earlier, when the critical 
stimulus is within the same attentional set as the primary task (Mack & Rock) levels 
of IB to the critical stimulus are much lower than when the critical stimulus is 
outside the attentional set of the primary task (Cartwrigh-Finch & Lavie), or within 
the distractor set (the present research). Most and colleagues (Most et al., 2005, 
Most et al., 2001) have also demonstrated the role of attentional set using the 
‘selective looking’ paradigm. However, Lavie and colleagues do not address this 
obviously important aspect of attention in their load theory of attention and 
cognitive control. 
 A second limitation of Lavie’s proposed theory is the difficulty involved in 
separating the two forms of load: perceptual and cognitive. Lavie and her colleagues 
propose there are two mechanisms involved in selective attention. The first is an 
early perceptual mechanism that selects on the basis of perceptual features, and the 
second is a cognitive control mechanism that is involved in maintaining top down 
attention on a primary task. However, the task used in the present research requires 
both selection on the basis of a perceptual feature, and the cognitive control of top 
down attention in order to perform the perceptual selection. The cognitive control 
mechanism is always going to be active when consciously participating in a 
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selective attention task, as attention has to be consciously directed to and maintained 
on the task until completion. In essence, it is not possible to investigate low 
perceptual load in an experimental setting without invoking some aspect of 
cognitive control. Similarly, perceptual processing will always be involved in a 
selection task, but unlike cognitive processing, it can be limited to processing the 
stimuli and excluded from the actual ‘selection’ process. For example, in a selection 
task in which targets are selected on their meaning rather than any perceptual 
characteristic, perceptual processing is involved in processing the visual stimuli but 
not in the selection of targets. In order to establish the true effect of cognitive load, 
it needs to be investigated in a selection task with a cognitive load manipulation that 
does not involve loading working memory, or perception based selection. Such 
research has yet to be conducted. 
 
The effect of critical stimulus presentation partner 
 As an additional consideration, the present research also investigated the 
detection of unexpected stimuli that occurred during an attentional task but in the 
absence of the attended object. Until recently, much of the research investigating 
inattentional blindness has primarily used either of two paradigms: Mack and 
Rock’s (1998) ‘inattention’ paradigm, or Neisser and Becklen’s (1975) ‘selective 
looking’ paradigm. While both of these paradigms are very useful for investigating 
the detection of unexpected stimuli under conditions of inattention, it is not possible 
to present the critical stimulus while the attended stimuli are absent. However, as 
demonstrated in Experiments 4 and 5, the RSVP task allows the critical stimulus to 
be presented either with a target item (like the ‘inattention’ and ‘selective looking’ 
paradigms), or with a distractor item. Interestingly, Experiment 5 showed that the 
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level of inattentional blindness to critical stimuli presented in conjunction with a 
target was not significantly greater than when the critical stimulus presented in 
conjunction with a distractor.  
 On initial thought, this result is surprising and counterintuitive. Surely 
detection will be greater in the absence of a target item than in its presence. 
However, after further consideration it becomes clear that the attentional processes 
involved the two situations are the same and only the response processes differ. This 
is because in an RSVP task participants have to maintain attention throughout the 
duration of the sequence. Prior to the presentation of an item, participants are 
unaware whether the item will be a target requiring a response, or a distractor. 
Therefore, until the moment in which the item is presented, the active attentional 
processes are the same regardless of the type of item presented. Once the item is 
present, either of two processes is engaged: response execution if the item is a target 
and withholding of response when the item is a distractor. Because the critical 
stimuli were the same colour as the distractor items, when a critical stimulus is 
presented with a distractor, both may be dismissed as task irrelevant information 
before being processed to a level of reportable awareness.  
 Along with the cognitive load effect discussed above, it is likely that 
attentional set has also influenced the investigation into the effect of presentation 
partner. In the present research, the levels of IB to an unexpected stimulus presented 
with a target do not differ from the levels of IB when the unexpected stimulus is 
presented with a distractor item. If the critical stimulus presented in conjunction 
with a distractor item was similar to the attended target items (red in colour), it 
would be processed beyond the physical attribute of its colour, and be more likely to 
capture attention and reach conscious awareness. Therefore, it is possible that the 
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present research was not sensitive enough to the role of attentional set to uncover an 
effect of presentation partner.  
 
Further Research 
 The IB RSVP task used in the current research provides a good method for 
investigating the role of attentional set and similarity in attention capture and 
awareness. Because this method uses a selective attention task in which both target 
and distractor items are necessary, the relationship between the critical unexpected 
stimuli and the attended and distractor sets can be easily manipulated. It is possible 
to vary the degree of similarity between the critical stimuli and the target and 
distractor sets on the basis of many perceptual features such as colour and size, 
along with finer perceptual and cognitive discriminations by using letter, digit and 
symbol sets. 
 Many of the early theories about the nature of attention assumed attention to 
be a singular ‘spotlight’ or ‘zoom-lens’ which could select a location or object, and 
could vary in size (e.g. Eriksen & Yeh, 1985, Posner, Snyder & Davidson,1980). 
However, recent research (see Cave & Bichot, 1999, for a review) indicates that 
attention can be split across non-contiguous regions of space, illuminating multiple 
objects and/or locations. The current method has potential for investigating the 
nature of attention and its spotlights. Because the RSVP task allows for multiple 
locations to be monitored, it is possible to manipulate the extent, shape and number 
of attended locations. It is also possible to manipulate the location of the unexpected 
stimulus, allowing it to appear at an attended location, within an attentional 
spotlight, or outside of attentional monitoring completely. Consequent levels of IB 
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 The present research set out to investigate the load theory of attention and 
cognitive control which claims to have provided a solution to the early versus late 
selection debate. It did so by developing a novel method of investigating IB, by 
combing an RSVP task with the ‘inattention’ paradigm. Consistent with the results 
of previous studies, the present research failed to find support for a mechanism of 
cognitive control that is affected by cognitive load.  
 Furthermore, the method developed for the current research allowed for a 
new IB investigation. The present research provides the first investigation into the 
detection of an unexpected stimulus when presented with a distractor item rather 
than a target item. Interestingly, the presentation partner did not affect the rate of IB 
to the unexpected stimulus. However, it is possible that the failure to find both an 
effect of cognitive load and an effect of presentation partner on the levels of IB 
could be due to the relationship between the attentional set of the RSVP task and the 
unexpected critical stimulus. Furthermore, the method developed for the current 
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